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FOREWORD
ETHICS, TRUTH, AND JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL
LITIGATION
Monroe H. Freedman"
N this symposium, the editors of the Fordhiam Law Review present
an important collection of articles on ethics, truth, and justice in
criminal litigation. All of these Articles explore what the applicable
standards of professional conduct mean and should mean as applied
to prosecutors and defense attorneys. Although the authors
participating in this symposium previously presented the substance of
their Articles in a series of panel discussions-one on prosecutorial
ethics and another on criminal defense ethics-which took place at
the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting in January
2000, these Articles represent more detailed versions of their
presentations.
Adding to his major contributions to the literature on evidence and
ethics, Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg calls attention to the Supreme
Court's "[apparent] lack of concern for false testimony-even in a
capital case."1 Professor Saltzburg focuses on Strickler v. Greene,2 an
illustration of the Court's appalling failure to respect the precept that
"death is different,"3 or to give even passing regard to the notion that
a trial is a "search for truth."4
* Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University Law
School.
1. Stephen Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter
So Much?, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1537, 1538 (2000).
2. 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999).
3. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 & n.9 (1983) ("The Court,
as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized
that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.");
see also, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (Marshall, J., plurality
opinion) ("In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding
procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability. This especial concern is a
natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different." (citation omitted)); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) ("[Tlhe
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however,
long.").
4. A trial is, indeed, a search for truth. Particularly in criminal cases, however, a
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Professor Saltzburg fully discusses the weighty prosecution
testimony of Anne Stoltzfus in Strickler, so I won't rehearse it here.
In brief, Stoltzfus testified in dramatic narrative and vivid detail to
Strickler's commanding role in abducting and brutalizing the victim in
a capital murder case. Stoltzfus was also the only witness who
graphically characterized Strickler as a violence-prone "Mountain
Man" and his codefendant, by contrast, as a "Shy Guy" who literally
took a back seat to Strickler in the victim's stolen car.' In light of
Stoltzfus's "exceptionally good memory," 6 both the jury and appellate
courts found her testimony compelling with regard to Strickler's guilt
of a capital offense. Not surprisingly, the prosecutor specifically relied
on Stoltzfus's testimony in arguing to the court that the evidence
presented by the state was sufficient to sustain the capital murder
charge.7 In addition, the prosecutor argued to the jury:
[W]e are lucky enough to have an eyewitness who saw [what]
happened out there in that parking lot. [In a] lot of cases you don't.
A lot of cases you can just theorize what happened in the actual
abduction. But Mrs. Stoltzfus was there, she saw [what] happened.8
Stoltzfus's testimony was also influential in the sentencing hearing,9
in which the jury decided that Strickler should be killed.
The trouble with Stoltzfus's testimony is that it was false. Several
documents withheld from the defense demonstrated that she
originally had only "muddled memories" of what had happened.
Moreover, what Stoltzfus presented at trial as a dramatic and brutal
abduction, she had previously "totally [written] ... off as a trivial
episode.... ,"" Indeed, Stoltzfus's coherent narrative of the
abduction, including her identification of "Mountain Man" Strickler,
was the result of "persistent" prompting by Detective Daniel
Claytor.1 As she wrote to Claytor, had it not been for the detective's
"patience," Stoltzfus "never would have made any of the associations
that you helped me make."12 Also, in a letter written to a newspaper
after the trial, Stoltzfus admitted:
It never occurred to me that I was witnessing an abduction. In fact,
if it hadn't been for the intelligent, persistent, professional work of
Detective Daniel Claytor, I still wouldn't realize it. What sounded
trial is also a striving for justice, as justice is defined in our constitutionalized
adversary system. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers'
Ethics 13-42 (1990) (discussing the adversary system).
5. See Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1944.
6. Id.; see also id. at 1953 (deciding that even without Stoltzfus's testimony,
Greene would have been convicted).
7. See id. at 1959 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 1953.
9. See id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10. Id. at 1945.
11. See id. at 1944-45, 1950 n.26.
12. Id. at 1945.
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like a coherent story at the trial was the result of an incredible effort
by the police to fit a zillion little puzzle pieces into one big picture.' 3
In short, Stoltzfus's testimony was false, and it was known to at least
one member of the prosecution team to have been so. And Strickler
was a death case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed
Strickler's conviction on the ground that the documents that had been
withheld from the defense were not "material" under Brady v.
Maryland.4
With careful analysis and restrained outrage, Professor Saltzburg
takes the Supreme Court and other courts to task for "ignor[ing] false
testimony, either because they cannot recognize it or do not care
about it."'1 5 As he shows, the Court does this in Strickler by treating
the case as one involving only Brady violations, when the case should
have been dealt with as one involving false testimony. The difference
in the standard for reversal of a conviction under the two lines of
authority is significant. For Brady violations, where "materiality" is
an element, the inquiry is whether there is a "a reasonable probability
that [the] conviction or sentence would have been different had these
materials been disclosed."' 6 In a false testimony case, however, the
inquiry is whether there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 7  Even
under this latter standard, of course, an accused can be convicted and
sentenced to death despite the fact that there is a reasonable
possibility that his conviction could have been the result of unlawfully
suppressed evidence.
There is another disheartening aspect to Strickler. No one on the
Court-or, apparently, anywhere else-seems to have been concerned
with the fact that Detective Claytor created Stoltzfus's detailed
narrative of a brutal abduction out of nothing more than Stoltzfus's
"muddled memories" about a "trivial" event.' 8 Arguably, Claytor did
not suborn perjury, because Stoltzfus came to believe the falsehoods
she told; thus, she didn't commit perjury; therefore, he couldn't be
said to have suborned perjury. But this is nonsense. How could
Stoltzfus have believed that she had "an exceptionally good memory"
when she had acknowledged before the trial that her memory about
the entire event was "muddled," and when she acknowledged after
the trial that she "still wouldn't realize" that she had even witnessed
an abduction-let alone the accompanying brutality to which she
13. Id. at 1950 n.26.
14. Id. at 1955.
15. Saltzburg, supra note 1, at 1579.
16. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1955 (emphasis added).
17. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103 (1976).
18. For a discussion of the ethics of preparing witnesses, including a discussion of
the psychology of memory, see Freedman, supra note 4, at 143-60.
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testified-were it not for Claytor's "persistent" help? 9
In the general lack of concern with Claytor's fabrication of
Stoltzfus's testimony, is there a lesson for police officers and lawyers
about how to "prepare" witnesses? Although effective, is what
Claytor did good police work? And, if a prosecutor was involved,
directly or indirectly, in Claytor's creation of Stoltzfus's narrative, did
that prosecutor act ethically? Professor Saltzburg suggests that the
Model Rules and the ABA Standards could be used to remedy the
courts' disturbing tolerance for false testimony. As he shows, the
knowing presentation of false testimony by the prosecution may not
be grounds for reversal of a conviction, but it can be grounds for
professional discipline of a lawyer, regardless of the "materiality" of
the falsehood. Unfortunately, however, prosecutors can avoid
"knowing" the truth as well as can other lawyers-regardless of how
disingenuous that lack of knowledge may be.2" For example, there is
no reason to believe that Claytor needed the help of anyone in the
prosecutors' office in constructing Stoltzfus's testimony. For purposes
of the ethical rules, therefore, the prosecutor could have taken the
case to trial without knowing what Claytor knew about the source of
Stoltzfus's testimony.
Professor Stanley Z. Fisher picks up the discussion at just that
point." As he notes, the Supreme Court has affirmed the prosecutor's
duty under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense
even if the police have not revealed the evidence to the prosecutor. 2
The problem, he explains, is that we have relied on self-regulation by
law enforcement agencies and the efforts of prosecutors to achieve
that end. Neither resort, he notes, has been, or promises to be,
effective in ensuring regular prosecutorial access to exculpatory
evidence known to the police. Although a legislative solution would
be best, it is not likely to happen.' Accordingly, Professor Fisher
proposes amendments to the ethical rules to require that prosecutors
make reasonable efforts to obtain access to exculpatory evidence
known to the police, and to guide prosecutors on how to carry out that
responsibility.2 4
I support Professor Fisher's proposals in the hope that such
amendments to the rules of professional responsibility would
ultimately have at least an educative effect on some prosecutors. But
19. With regard to the creation of false memories, see generally Elizabeth Loftus
& Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory (1994).
20. For a discussion of how Model Rule 3.3 has been undercut by disingenuous
use of the "knowing" requirement, see Freedman, supra note 4, at 139-141, app. B-1
to -8.
21. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379 (2000).
22. See id. at 1379-80.
23. Id. at 1380.
24. Id. app. B.
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would the new rules be enforced? Would disciplinary committees add
the threat of professional sanctions to prompt prosecutors to do their
duty? And, if not, would amendments to the ethical rules be any
more effective than the constitutional obligations that the Court has
already recognized?
Particularly in the light of those questions, I support Professor Ellen
S. Podgor's proposals for more educational efforts in prosecutors'
offices and in law schools regarding the appropriate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion s Indeed, Professor Fisher's recommended
amendments to the ethical rules would facilitate Professor Podgor's
proposals. Nevertheless, the most effective remedy for prosecutorial
abuse is probably the effective use of the professional disciplinary
system.
Also recognizing that prosecutors can be overzealous, Professor H.
Richard Uviller has an intriguing suggestion. He advocates making
the prosecutor's discretionary role a less adversarial one in the earlier
stages of a case.' He would accomplish this through a structural
change in prosecutors' offices, by assigning the investigative and
quasi-adjudicative prosecutorial functions to lawyers who would not
be involved in the adversarial aspects of trying cases. Thus, he seeks
to establish a "dedicated detachment" on the part of those
prosecutors who exercise discretion in the pretrial stages.2? The
proposal seems impractical to me, however, because of necessary
overlapping in these prosecutorial functions, a difficulty that Professor
Uviller recognizes. Not having Professor Uviller's considerable
experience as a prosecutor,' however, I defer to his judgment and
endorse his proposal.
All of these concerns with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
are given more urgency by Professor Kevin C. McMunigal's insightful
Article. He argues persuasively that, in important respects,
prosecutorial standards are no less adversarial than those affecting
other lawyers are, and that prosecutors, in some instances, are placed
in a more adversarial role than other lawyers are.' As one example,
Professor McMunigal shows that the prosecutor's discovery
obligations under Brady are more limited, and therefore less
cooperative and more adversarial, than the civil litigator's discovery
25. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1511,1534 (2000).
26. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion
in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695,1718 (2000).
27. See id
28. Professor Uviller joined the office of the District Attorney of New York
County in 1954 and served chief of its appeals bureau from 1961-1968. See Columbia
University, Faculty and Administration-H. Ridard Uviller (visited Mar. 27, 2000)
<httpJ//ww.law.columbia.edu/faculty/huviller.html>.
29. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1453,1453 (2000).
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obligations.3" In view of the fact that the prosecutor "wields the most
terrible instruments of government,"31 Professor McMunigal's analysis
provides strong reason for concern about unrestrained use of
prosecutorial discretion.
Another article on prosecutors, by Dean Kenneth B. Nunn, deals
with a wholly different issue-the so-called "Darden Dilemma,"
which raises the question of whether African-Americans should be
prosecutors.32 An important part of the analysis, of course, returns us
to the issue of prosecutorial discretion.
Dean Nunn first posits his premises: (1) American society is racist;
(2) The criminal justice system is arguably the most racist institution
in the United States, both in its treatment of African-Americans and
in the attitudes of its participants; (3) Prosecutors exercise significant
discretion within the criminal justice system. Therefore, Dean Nunn
concludes, African-Americans should not be prosecutors.33  As
Professor Austin Scott used to say, I understand everything but the
therefore.
I agree, of course, with Dean Nunn's premises. His conclusion,
however, is breathtaking, on its own and in its implications.
Corporate America is also racist, both in its treatment of African-
Americans and in the attitudes of its participants. How, then, could
an African-American be associated with a law firm doing corporate
practice, especially when that firm's clients might selectively pollute
the environment, with selective emphasis on Black communities?
Alternatively, how can an African-American big-firm-lawyer work
with clients who in the course of their real estate dealings,
discriminate against Blacks; or clients who are banks that
discriminate; and so on? Logically, Dean Nunn would also bar
African-American lawyers from serving as law clerks for judges, who
are key participants in our racist criminal justice system.- Indeed,
Dean Nunn suggests that the only job an African-American lawyer
can take in good conscience is as a public interest lawyer or a legal aid
30. See id. at 1464-65.
31. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring)
(quoting Felix Frankfurter, Letter, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1941).
32. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1473 (2000).
33. See id. at 1509.
34. Thus, for him, the efforts to get the Supreme Court to hire more Black law
clerks would appear also to be counter-productive. See generally, Tony Mauro, U.S.
Court Justices Grilled Over Lack of Diversity Among Clerks, N.J. L.J., Mar. 20, 2000,
(reporting on a recent congressional hearing concerning the paucity of minority law
clerks selected by Supreme Court justices); Editorial, Needed: Minority Clerks at the
Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1999 (advocating an increase in the number of minority
law clerks that Supreme Court justices hire); Tony Mauro, Burnish Supreme Court's
Minority Hiring Image, USA Today, Mar. 14, 2000 (discussing public response to the
scarce number of minority law clerks selected by Supreme Court justices).
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attorney "working on the root causes of crime." 35
These are worthy jobs and can be gratifying, but the proposal puts a
rather severe limitation on job opportunities for young African-
American lawyers with student loans to repay. More important, it is
out of touch with reality. In several years of doing indigent criminal
defense work, I came to realize that you can do far more good as a
conscientious prosecutor than as a fire-eating defense lawyer. Some
of the most important cases that I defended were cases that a decent
prosecutor would never have pursued in the first place. That is, we
are returning to prosecutorial discretion-a discretion that I, and I
hope Dean Nunn, would want exercised with what Professor Uviller
calls "dedicated detachment,"36 which does not exclude an element of
understanding and compassion.
Another significant contribution bearing on the trial as a search for
truth is Professor Ellen Yankiver Suni's Article on blame-shifting in
criminal cases. 37 As she points out, the rules of evidence in most
jurisdictions prohibit the introduction of alternative-perpetrator
evidence unless there is a "direct connection" established between the
evidence and the crime. -  Consequently, a defense that another
person committed the crime cannot be maintained unless there is
"substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the
actual commission of the offense."3 9 Here again, we are concerned in
part with the unwillingness of courts to pursue truth in the form of
evidence that tends to establish a reasonable doubt about the State's
case. Courts have refused to allow evidence that an alternative
perpetrator had the motive and the means to commit the crime, or
that he made threats against the victim, or that he was seen with blood
on his hands in the vicinity of the crime, or that he had assaulted the
victim two weeks before the crime.4 All of these proffers satisfy the
requirement of relevance, that is, a "rational tendency to engender a
reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's
case," or "tend[ing] in any way, even indirectly, to establish a
reasonable doubt of [a] defendant's guilt."4 Each of the proffers was
inadmissible, however, because of a lack of "direct connection." '4
In an original and thoughtful Article, Professors Christopher
Slobogin and Amy Mashburn take on one of the most difficult issues
35. See Nunn, supra note 32, at 1506. That is a fantasy that I would like to share,
but it is far removed from the triage and the plea bargaining of actual practice in legal
aid and public defender offices.
36. See Uviller, supra note 26, at 1718.
37. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law
and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 Fordharn L Rev. 1643 (2000).
38. See id. at 1675.
39. See id. at 1676.
40. See id. at 1677.
41. See id. at 1692.
42. See id.
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in the ethics of criminal defense-how to represent the client who
suffers from a mental disability.43 For me, indeed, the issue is not just
difficult but impossible to resolve in a principled way,4 because my
system of lawyers' ethics is premised on an autonomous client who, by
axiom, is competent to make decisions affecting her own life.45
Professors Slobogin and Mashburn conclude, paradoxically, that the
lawyer shows respect for the incompetent client's autonomy by
refusing to heed the client's expressed wishes.
There is a way to resolve that paradox. In The Odyssey, wanting to
hear the Sirens but not wanting to be destroyed by them, Odysseus
commands his men to plug their own ears with wax, to tie him to the
mast, and to disobey any commands to untie him that he would later
give under the influence of the Sirens.46 Like Odysseus, the
incompetent client who gives commands against his true interests
would not really, in a rational state, want those commands carried out.
How do we know that? We can't. But we can make a Rawlsian
judgment that each of us, in a rational state but recognizing the
possibility of later incompetence, would want any irrational, self-
harming commands to be ignored. Thus, the lawyer respects the
client's autonomy, in a Rawlsian rational state, by ignoring the
incompetent client's irrational, self-harming demands.
Taken together, the Articles in this symposium advance to a new
level the discussion of longstanding ethical issues in criminal
procedure. These Articles also shed more light upon the quality of
criminal representation available in the United States and help focus
future discussions on the applicable standards of professional conduct.
43. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1581, 1582(2000).
44. I confess that when I represented several incompetent clients during the 1960s,
I simply made an ad hoc decision in each case about how I should proceed, based on
my own subjective judgment of the best interests of the client. These judgments were
made without the benefit of any systematic, or perhaps any rational, criteria of how to
determine the best interests of the client.
45. See generally Freedman, supra note 4, at 43-64 (discussing client autonomy).
46. See Homer, The Odyssey bk. XII, 11. 185-98, at 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans.,
Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998) (n.d.).
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